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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages and injuries suffered on
January 13, 1973 when an automobile driven by defendantappellant Jolene Jaye Simons struck Judith Johnson, a pedestrian.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried September 9 through 11, 1975, before
a jury in Salt Lake City, Utah, Honorable James S. Sawaya of the
Third Judicial District Court presiding.

Judgment was entered on

the jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs-respondents for $1,500
special damages and $35,000 general damages.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek reversal of the lower court
judgment, or, in the alternative, an order remanding the case for
a new trial.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
DEFENDANTS1 REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19.
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POINT II. WHERE CONFUSION EXISTED CONCERNING WHETHER THE
CASE WAS BEING TRIED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE
ISSUES TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT.
POINT III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUMMON THE
JURY PANEL AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS AND IN
DENYING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO READ JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 1-A TO THE JURY.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 13, 1973, defendant-appellant Jolene Jaye Simons,*
then 16 years old, while driving an automobile registered in the
name of her father, Dan C. Simons, struck plaintiff-respondent
Judith Johnson, a pedestrian, then also 16 years old.

The

pedestrian, through her father as guardian ad litem, brought an
action for negligence against the driver and her father.

Defen-

dants denied the allegations of negligence and alleged sole or
contributory negligence on the part of the injured pedestrian.
At trial the evidence showed that the collision occurred
after dark at approximately 6:00 p.m. on Highland Drive at about
6350 South in Salt Lake County at a place where there were no
sidewalks, curb, or gutter; no marked crosswalk, semaphore signal
or other traffic control devices; and only very sparse street
lighting.

The street was wet but not frozen, and snow from

*By the time of trial, Jolene Jaye Simons was married. In
the trial transcript she is usually referred to as Mrs. McBride.
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earlier snowfalls was evidenced by remaining snowbanks off the
travelled portion of the street.

Traffic was moderately heavy

southbound, with cars travelling both immediately in front of and
behind the collision vehicle.
The driver testified that she was travelling southbound on
Highland Drive when she glanced briefly at the speedometer. As
she again focused her eyes on the road she saw the pedestrian
immediately in front of her right fender and was unable to avoid
hitting her.

The pedestrian came in contact with the car at a

point approximately twelve inches from the right front side of
the car near the right headlight.

The pedestrian was thrown onto

the hood, glanced off the right front windshield and top portion
of the car, and came to rest to the west of and off the travelled
portion of the roadway.
The driver immediately pulled off the road and then started
backing up the street to where the impact occurred.

A Deputy

Sheriff who had been following either in the first or second car
behind the accident vehicle, but who was unaware of the collision,
stopped Miss Simons as she backed up the street.

He was informed

of the accident after which he walked back along the roadway, and
after a few moments of searching, found the injured plaintiff
near a snowbank west of the travelled portion of the road.

(Tr.

13-32)
The only eye witnesses to the accident were Miss Simons' two
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younger brothers (ages 14 and 11) who were seated in the front
seat with her.

At trial the driver testified that she was

travelling about 30 miles per hour, that she was near the center
line of the two lane roadway, and that the pedestrian was well
into the travelled portion of the roadway at the point of impact.
The pedestrian suffered retrograde amnesia and had no
recollection of the events immediately before the accident.

(Tr.

63-64) However, the pedestrian testified that she lived on the
east side of Highland Drive; that she had been to the house of a
friend on the west side of Highland Drive which was within walking
distance from her own home; that she frequently walked home from
her friend's house by following the same customary route; and
that the place where the accident occurred was where she customarily crossed over to the east side of Highland Drive to get
home.

(Tr. 72-73)

Plaintiffs1 expert witness, David Lord, testified that the
probable point of impact was "some distance north of where the
body actually came to rest and it would be on the west side of
the road,11 and added, "Now, the exact position I would--! wouldn't
even be able to make a wild guess."

(Tr. 130) Newell K. Knight,

called as an expert witness for defendants, testified that the
evidence would just as easily support the conclusion that the
pedestrian was well into the travelled portion of the highway
when hit.

(Tr. 149-155)

The court approved the right to make a record at a later

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time of counsel's exceptions to the jury instructions given by
the court.

(Tr. 167 and Supplemental Transcript of Proceedings

before the court on October 6, 1975, pages 29-30).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19
Counsel for defendants-appellants asked the court to give
its requested jury instruction No. 19 which states:
Contributory negligence is negligence on the part
of the person injured which, cooperating with the
negligence of another, assists in proximately causing
her own injury.
One who is guilty of contributory negligence may
not recover from another for any injury suffered
because if both parties were at fault in negligently
causing an accident, the degree of negligence cannot be
weighed by the jury.
(R. 92)
This is standard J.I.F.U. Instruction No. 15.5 and is customarily
given to govern a contributory negligence issue. While counsel
were considering jury instructions in chambers with Judge Sawaya,
the judge said that the substance of defendants' requested
instruction No. 19 would be included in stock instructions prepared by the judge and customarily given by him.

He then noted

in the lower right-hand corner of the instruction, in his own
handwriting:
"9-11-75 given in substance JSS"
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However, the critical phrase in defendants' requested
instruction No. 19--namely, "One who is guilty of contributory
negligence may not recover from another for any injury suffered...11
--was never given by the court.
The first sentence of defendants1 requested instruction No.
19 defining contributory negligence was covered in Jury Instruction
No. 15 given by the court.

(R. 142)

The last part of the second

sentence of defendants1 requested Jury Instruction No. 19 was
covered by Jury Instruction No. 17 given by the court as follows:
The law forbids you to attempt to classify negligence into degrees or grades or kinds, or to compare
one instance of negligence with another and judge which
is more deserving of reproof or excuse. If you should
find that there was negligent conduct on the part of
both the plaintiff and defendant, you are not to
attempt to determine which was guilty of the greater
negligence. (R. 144)
Still missing, however, is the heart of defendants1 requested instruction No. 19 which would have advised the jury that
upon finding the injured party was contributorily negligent, no
award of damages should be made.
The law clearly requires the court to inform the jury of
the legal effect of contributory negligence.
gence, §§298, 299 (1971).

57 Am.Jur.2d Negli-

For example, in Case v. Peterson,

17 Wash. 2d 523, 136 P.2d 192, 194 (1943), the court stated:
When the court instructs a jury on a subject such
as contributory negligence, it should define the term
and then advise what effect it should give to a finding
that contributory negligence existed as a guide to the
verdict it should render. Gallup v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.,
295 Pa. 203, 145 A. 73; Pawnee Farmers' Elevator & Supply

-6-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Co, v. Powell, 76 Colo. .1, 227 P. 836, 37 A.L.R. 6;
Frederick Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Traver, 36 Okl. 717,
129 P. 747. The trial court was in error in not so
instructing the jury.
In Smith v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.,
498 P.2d 402, 405 (Okla. 1972), the court noted:
Thus, the jury is to be clearly instructed that if
they find and believe from the evidence that primary
negligence and proximate cause have been established,
then their verdict should be for the plaintiff; but if
they do not so find, or do find from the evidence that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as defined in
the instructions, then their verdict should be for the
defendant. Whether the court uses the word "should" or
"must" is not of great importance. . . Either word used
in the contributory negligence instruction will inform
the jury that plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict if
they find and believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence caused
or contributed to his injuries.
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a similar position.

In

Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893, 896 (1929), the court
noted:
The jury should have been instructed that it was
the duty of the plaintiff to yield the right of way to
the defendant as the two approached the intersection if
it would have reasonably appeared to a reasonable and
prudent man under the circumstances existing and the
relative speed at which they were driving that a
collision was to be apprehended. The jury should also
have been instructed that if, under such conditions,
the plaintiff failed to yield the right of way, and
that such failure on his part proximately contributed
to the accident, he could not recover, (emphasis added)
Similarly, in Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87,
283 P. 160, 166-177 (1929), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the
specific issue of contributory negligence of a pedestrian and
held:
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All that it is intended to hold is that defendant
is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to
the jury. Briefly, they were entitled to have the jury
told, in substance, that, in crossing or attempting to
cross a public street, it was the duty of the deceased
to exercise due care and reasonable vigilance to
discover approaching vehicles, and that, if the jury
should find that as a matter of fact the deceased
failed to do what due care required by suddenly,
without looking, stepping out from the curb line between
two parked cars directly into or in front of defendants1
car at a time and under such circumstances that defendants1
agent could not, by the exercise of ordinary care, have
avoided the accident they might find such conduct to be
negligent on the part of the deceased, and, if they
further found that such negligence directly contributed
to the accident, then plaintiff could not recover.
(emphasis added)
As described more fully under Point II hereafter, this
instruction was of critical importance because the court, in the
course of impanelling the jury, had made confusing mention of the
fact that a recent change in the law meant that this case would
be tried under different principles than those which some of the
prospective jurors may have applied in other cases during their
term of jury service.
Furthermore, as described more fully under Point III hereafter, failure to instruct the jury that contributory negligence
bars recovery by an injured party created not only possible
confusion and error by the jury but actual confusion and error.
Seven of the eight jurors concluded that the pedestrian was
guilty of contributory negligence, yet awarded her damages.

The

dissenting juror believed the pedestrian was solely negligent*
Two of the jurors thought there was a jury instruction saying
that the plaintiff could not recover if she was contributorily
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negligent; however, in searching the instructions furnished by
the court, they found none to that effect, and therefore joined
in approving an award to the plaintiff even though they believed
she was also negligent.

(R. 54; See also Appendix A and Appendix

B to this brief).

POINT II
WHERE CONFUSION EXISTED CONCERNING WHETHER THE
CASE WAS BEING TRIED UNDER PRINCIPLES OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE
ISSUES TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT
Because of the confusion injected into the trial of this
case by a change in the law (from contributory to comparative
negligence) after the date of the subject accident, and because
of the court's confusing reference to that change while impanelling the jury, defendants-appellants requested that the issues be
submitted to the jury on special verdict.

(R.69-72)

This request

was denied (R.69) and the case was submitted to the jury on a
general verdict.

(R.65-66 and 165)

In January, 1973, the Utah State Legislature enacted the
provisions now contained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2737, and related provisions, which took effect on May 8, 1973.
The effect of this legislation was to preserve contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery for injuries suffered before the
effective date, but to adopt principles of comparative negligence
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in awarding damages for injuries suffered after the effective
date of this legislation.

The accident which is the subject of

this present action occurred in January, 1973, the month when the
legislative change was enacted, but before the effective date of
the change.
*'.'•• The prospective jurors summoned in this action were serving
in the third and last month of their term which commenced July 1,
1975.

During that term the court had tried injury cases which

had arisen after May 8, 1973, and which were therefore tried
under principles of comparative negligence.
In the presence of all prospective jurors and before the
jury panel was selected and sworn, the following dialogue took
place while the jury was being impanelled:

THE COURT:

*.U

JU

^»-

-»,.

*.U

JU

/\

/v

/\

s\

/\

/\

' •

•'

Ladies and Gentlemen, as I have indicated-

well, let me get a show of hands how many of you have
served as Jurors before.

That's generally most of you.

Thank you.
How many of you have served on a case involving an
automobile or an auto-pedestrian accident or any kind
of vehicle accident where one party was suing to
recover damages as the result of injury or property
damage?

Let me have a show of hands.

Mrs. Rasmussen, you appear to be the only one..
Now, that's unusual.

Tell me when that was, will you please?
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IDA RASMUSSEN:

It was under Judge Hall on the

15th of July.
THE COURT:

During this Term?

IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

IDA RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

And that was a --

Automobile accident.

Two automobiles collided?

IDA RASMUSSEN:

Automobile and a motorcycle.

THE COURT: And do you recall the date when that
accident happened?
IDA RASMUSSEN:

I know that's asking you to-Let's see.

Sometime in July a

year ago.
THE COURT:

All right.

IDA RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

In 1974?

Uh-huh.

Did you -- were you asked to return a

verdict in this matter?
IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes.
THE COURT:

And you did in fact return a verdict?

IDA RASMUSSEN: Yes.
THE COURT:

Were you asked to answer certain ques-

tions with regard to the degree of negligence of the
parties?
IDA RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

Yes, in per cent wise.

All right.

Mrs. Rasmussen, this case

will be somewhat different and I am going to try and
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explain to you that the law changed in January of 1973 and
accidents happening after that date we ask the Juries to
apportion the negligence and with regard to accidents
happening prior to that date we ask them not to apportion
negligence.
IDA RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Now, do you think that -- in other

words, the law that I tell you will be different than
the law that Judge Hall explained to you and do you
believe that you could follow the law of the case as I
state it and put out of your mind the fact that Judge Hall
explained to you something different?
IDA RASMUSSEN:
THE COURT:

I think so.

All right.

MR. POELMAN:

Is there anyone else?

Just a minute.

For clarification,

the change in law was enacted in January of !73 but the
effective day of that was May 8th.
THE COURT:

That's right.

MR. POELMAN:

May 8th, 1973.

But in either case --

The difference would be established,

yes. • .

THE COURT:

Fine.

Is there anyone else that

served as a Juror on a case involving an accident
between two vehicles, auto-pedestrian, auto-motorcycle,
any kind of accident case?

All right.

Thank you.
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The

record may show no other hands are raised.
(Transcript Page 2 line 30 through Page 4 line 27)
•X*

M*

*»*-•

*.•.*

*A*

•*"-»

/V

v\

/\

/\

/\

/\

Here the court made mention of a change in the law, said the
law to be applied in this case would not permit the jury to
apportion negligence between the parties, but did not say that
contributory negligence by the injured party would bar recovery.
These comments injected several elements of confusion into
the case.

First, the court referred to the statils of the law for

accidents occurring before January, 1973, and after January,
1973, but did not clarify the status of the law for accidents
occurring during January, 1973.

Defendants1 counsel requested

the court to clarify the matter at that time, but the judge left
the matter dangling with an unfinished sentence^leaving unresolved the timing and nature of that change as it would apply to
this case.
Second, the court's comments implied that the only difference between the former law and the more recent modification was
that the court now asks the jury to apportion negligence, whereas
in the past it did not.

Presumably, therefore, the jury could

deliberate in the same manner under the old and new laws, the
only difference being that the court would not require the jury
to apportion negligence under the former law.
Third, the court at no time explained to the jury or prospective
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jurors what is meant by "apportion negligence", a phrase that can
only be understood in light of the real difference between
contributory negligence and comparative negligence.
This dialogue could only serve to raise questions in the
minds of the jurors which were never answered in the jury instructions or otherwise.
Although use of a special verdict will usually be deemed
discretionary with the court, special circumstances such as were
present in this case, may require the use of a special verdict
rather than a general verdict.

This court has previously noted

in Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264, 267 (1957):
[G]reat care should be taken to submit questions to the
jury so that they are as clear as possible. When a general
verdict will best settle the issues, it should be used.
When specific issues cannot be reached by a general verdict,
the trial court should take advantage of special verdicts or
special interrogatories.
Under these special circumstances the court erred or abused
its discretion in failing to submit the issues on special interrogatories which would have prevented the jury from improperly
awarding damages to one whom they found to be contributorily
negligent.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUMMON
THE JURY PANEL AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS AND
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Appellants acknowledge the general rule that affidavits of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jurors are not admissible evidence for the purpose of impeaching
the jury's own verdict, but the rule permits certain exceptions
applicable in this case.

One such exception was recognized by

this Court in Moulton v. Staats, 83 Utah 197, 27 P.2d 455 (1933).
In that case, the jury apparently disregarded an instruction
given by the court, whereupon counsel moved that the jury's
verdict be amended or modified, which motion was accompanied by
supporting affidavits of the jurors.

Opposing counsel moved to

suppress the affidavits on the ground that the jury may not
impeach its own verdict.

In rejecting that motion, the court

noted at page 459:
The general rule, that the statements of jurors
will not be received to establish their own misconduct,
or to impeach their verdict, does not prevent the
reception of their evidence as to what really was the
verdict agreed on, in order to prove that, through
mistake or otherwise, it has not been correctly expressed, as the agreement reached by the jury, and not
the written paper filed, is the verdict; and a showing
that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of
the verdict itself.
Affidavits of jurors are admissible to show that
the verdict, as received and entered of record, by
reason of a mistake, does not embody the true finding
of the jury.
More recently, this Court in Brown v. Johnson,
388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970),

24 Utah 2d

has followed the Moulton exception.

When confronted with an affidavit from one of the jurors
explaining that the general verdict submitted was inconsistent
with the intended verdict by the jury, the court noted at page
946 n.l:
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While jurors may not by affidavit or otherwise
impeach their verdict, they may give proof to explain
it.
The court quoted at length from the Moulton decision to
support the proposition that an affidavit by the juror may be
used to explain the intended verdict of the jury rather than the
verdict entered on paper.
This court has twice declared that finding the jury "misunderstood or disregarded the law" is a proper ground for a new
trial.

In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701,

703-04 (1961) this court held:
The trial judge should not grant a new trial,
merely because in his opinion the amount of
the award was insufficient or excessive.
Such action is warranted only when to the trial
judge, "it seems clear that the jury has misapplied
or failed to take into account proven facts; or
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made
findings clearly against the weight of the
evidence. . ." (emphasis added) (citing Mr. Justice
Crockett's concurring opinion in Holmes v. Nelson,
7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P. 2d 722, 7 5 2 - 2 F 7 1 9 W :
Whether the jury "misunderstood or disregarded the law" can
best be determined from affidavits of the jurors or, where
indication of such misunderstanding or disregard exists, through
an examination of the jurors by the court.
The affidavits presented in the instant case clearly show
and explain that the real verdict reached by the jury was that
both parties were negligent.

Nevertheless, because of the con-

fusion surrounding the legal consequences of contributory negligence and failure by the trial court to provide a clear instruction
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to dispel that confusion, the jury arrived at a recorded verdict
which was clearly inconsistent with their factual findings.
Furthermore, the general rule prohibiting a jury from
impeaching its own verdict has been rejected in recent cases
where its application would bring about unjust results. For
example, in Hunter v. Smallwood, 328 N.E.2d 344 (111. App.
1975), the court recognized the use of affidavits by jurors in a
case where the jury became confused by the verdict form submitted
to them by the court.

The court remarked:

By a long established rule in this State, affidavits
of jurors would not be admissible to impeach a duly
rendered verdict. . . . This is a salutary rule, designed
to prevent jury tampering and to "suppress the dissatisfied juror.1'. . .
But there are some exceptions to the general rule.
Where the record itself shows that the jury is hopelessly
confused, or the affidavits tend to show that the
verdict rendered and recorded was not the one agreed
upon by the jurors, then we believe that the affidavits
may be considered. . . .
[I]t must be remembered that jurors are laymen and
not accustomed to legal language. . . . The affidavits
of the four jurors is fairly persuasive that the verdict rendered was not the one which was reached by the
jury. It is not simply a case of one juror's affidavit
to the effect that he did not agree with the verdict or
participate in the decision.
Obviously the time has long since passed when the
original jurors may be brought back into court and
questioned concerning the verdict. As a result of the
apparent prejudice to appellant, it is clear that some
remedy should be forthcoming. We conclude that a new
trial should be granted.
Appropriate exceptions to the general rule which prohibits
use of juror's affidavits to impeach a jury verdict must be
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viewed in relation to the reasons for the rule.

The purpose of

the rule is not to favor finality of a verdict at the expense of
justice.

As stated in Hunter v. Smallwood, supra, the rule is

designed to prevent jury tampering and to suppress the dissatisfied
juror.
Although abuse of the procedure could be damaging and
cannot be condoned, it is fully appropriate and customary for
counsel to talk with jurors after the verdict has been rendered.
Indeed, Rule 59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates as grounds for a new trial, matters which can only be
determined by counsel speaking with jurors after the verdict is
rendered.
In the present case, the affidavit of Juror Gaylen R. Coles
(R. 53; also see Appendix A to this brief) arose from the juror's
own later realization that the jury had misapplied the law and
from his own request that defendants1 counsel contact him to
discuss the error.

Rather than burdening each of the other

jurors with a request that they sign an affidavit attesting their
common error (which might have raised a suspicion of jury tampering) , defendants1 counsel submitted his own affidavit describing the conversation he had with each juror and informing the
court that each juror believed the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent.
The affidavit of defendants' counsel was not submitted to
the court as conclusive evidence of the matters set forth therein,
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but was submitted to alert the court that justice had miscarried,
and to show substantial cause why the trial court itself should
have examined the jurors to determine their correct findings
concerning the issue of contributory negligence.

Consideration

of these affidavits does not in any way threaten the sanctity of
jury verdicts, but rather strengthens trial by jury in providing
a remedy for an injustice imposed upon defendants which is
clearly contrary to applicable Utah law.
If the jurors were not properly instructed on the issue of
contributory negligence, then the court should have granted a new
trial on that issue.

If the jurors failed or refused to apply

the correct law to that issue, then they violated their jurors'
oath, which constitutes misconduct by the jury and is ground for
a new trial.

Where the likelihood of error or misconduct was so

clearly established by the affidavits before the court, which
affidavits were unopposed, the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in failing to grant a new trial and in withholding its
aid in preventing a miscarriage of justice.
How can a government of laws, in the name of compliance with
its procedural or evidentiary rules, allow a verdict to stand
which each juror acknowledges is inconsistent with the unanimous
findings of the jurors and is inconsistent with the law which
should have been applied?

If such were the result, we surely

would have reached the stage in the disintegration of our legal
system where rules originally designed to promote justice have
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now become deadly tools to obstruct and prevent it.

i

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO READ
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1-A TO THE JURY

Jury Instruction No. 1-A states:
You must weigh and consider this case without
regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion for or
against any party to the action. (R. 128)
This is a standard jury instruction designated as J.I.F.U.
Instruction 1.5.

When counsel met with Judge Sawaya in chambers

to discuss jury instructions, defendants1 counsel requested this
instruction (R. 82), which request was granted by the judge who
noted his approval thereon.

(R. 82)

The court did not furnish to counsel for the parties a
complete set of the jury instructions in the order in which they
were given.

Counsel for the parties had three sets of jury

instructions:

those requested by the plaintiff, those requested

by the defendant, and those standard instructions which the court
said it would give in addition to certain designated instructions
requested by the parties.
Through a clerical oversight, Instruction No. 1-A was not
included in the instructions read by the court to the jury.

This

omission was not observed by defendants1 counsel until plaintiffs'
counsel had commenced his highly emotional argument through most
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of which plaintiff, Judith Johnson, sat at the counsel table in
tears.

At one point, when speaking of the accident and the

plaintiff's injuries, plaintiffs' counsel became emotional,
choked up, asked the jury's indulgence while he paused, withdrew
a handkerchief from his pocket and wiped away the tears from his
own eyes.

(Tr. 169.; See also Supplemental Transcript of Pro-

ceedings on October 6, 1975, pp. 3 and 4)
As soon as plaintiff's counsel concluded the opening portion
of his closing testimony, the court ordered a brief recess,
whereupon counsel for the parties met with Judge Sawaya in
chambers.

The court acknowledged that defendants' requested Jury

Instruction No. 9 had been inadvertently omitted from the jury
instructions given.

The court expressed reluctance, however,

about highlighting that instruction by reading it separately to
the jury at that stage.

To help minimize the damage done by such

omission, defendants' counsel agreed to read Instruction 1-A
during his closing argument without reference to the fact that it
had not been read by the court.

The omitted instruction was

assigned its No. 1~A and a copy was placed in the compilation of
jury instructions sent with the jury to the jury room.

(See

Supplemental Transcript of Proceedings on October 6, 1975, pp. 3
and 4)
Because the jury did not receive directly from the judge the
contents of the omitted instruction, any effort by defendants'
counsel to supply the contents of that instruction was insuf-
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ficient to instill in the jury the importance of the instruction
since it lacked the explicit authoritative approval by the court.
While it is impossible to know whether the jury thought that
Jury Instruction No. 1-A had been read to them by the judge or
whether they thought defendants1 counsel was usurping the prerogatives of the court by giving instructions not included with
those given by the court, the irregularity in failing to give
such a basic, standard instruction, especially in view of the
emotion demonstrated in the courtroom by plaintiffs and their
counsel, was of substantial prejudice to the defendants and a
proper ground meriting reversal or a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Because the court (1) failed to instruct the jury that a
finding of contributory negligence would bar an award of damages
to the plaintiff, (2) failed to submit the issues to the jury on
a special vereict where great confusion existed concerning a
change in the law and what law was applicable to the present
case, (3) failed to summon the jury panel and rectify the miscarriage of justice which was apparent from unopposed affidavits
and (4) omitted reading to the jury a standard instruction that
they must weigh and consider the case without regard to sympathy,
prejudice or passion for or against any party to the action, the
court should either have entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or granted defendants' motion for a ne\«7 trial.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed or the case remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
POELMAN, FOX, EDWARDS &.OSWALD

,OYD P0E1
36 South State Street
Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Served two (2) copies of the foregoing
Brief on Respondents by delivering them
to E. H. Fankhauser at 430 Judge
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/ V " day of March, 1976.
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STRONG, POELMAN & FOX (Poeltnan)
Attorneys for Defendants
36 South State Street, Suite 2000
The Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 521-7751
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOYD A. JOHNSON and FLOYD A.
JOHNSON as guardian ad litem
for JUDITH JOHNSON, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
A F F I D A V I T
C i v i l No. 216,731

vs.
JOLENE JAYE SIMONS, a minor,
and DAN C. SIMONS,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The undersigned Galen R. Coles, being first duly sworn
on oath deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the jurors which was selected as part of

the panel which heard the above-entitled case on September 9
through September 11, 1975, having voted in favor of the
verdict which was entered on September 11, 1975.
2. Shortly after entering the jury room and selecting a
foreman, a poll was taken by the jurors to determine whether
they believed that either the defendant Jolene Simons or the
plaintiff Judith Johnson was negligent in causing the automobilepedestrian accident on June 13, 1973. The results of
that poll were that all jurors stated that they believed the
plaintiff Judith Johnson was negligent and all of the jurors
except George S. Davis stated that they believed the defendant
Jolene Simons was negligent.
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3. Having so determined, the jurors then proceeded to
determine what damages should be awarded to the plaintiff.
4.

It is my clear understanding and firm belief that at

the time the award was made and the verdict entered all of the
members of the jury panel, myself included, believed that at
the time of the accident the plaintiff Judith Johnson was
standing in the roadway and that she was negligent in being
there rather than remaining off to the side of the roadway
until it was safe for her to cross or otherwise move upon the
roadway.
5.

I further firmly believe that none of the jurors

understood that if we found the plaintiff to be contributorily
negligent then no award of damages should have been made.
6.

I have read the foregoing and declare the content

thereof to be true of my own knowledge except as to matters
set forth upon information and belief and as to such matters .
I believe them to be true.

mLi^A,

(<^<c&L

\m R. COLES
4458 Koneywood Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/ 0

day of

September, 1975.

&>
/

UL^JLQ^U^

NOTARY FUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

My commission expires:
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STRONG, POELMAN & FOX (Poelman)
Attorneys for Defendants
36 South State Street, Suite 2000
The Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 521-7751
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOYD A. JOHNSON and FLOYD A.
JOHNSON as guardian ad litem
for JUDITH JOHNSON, a minor,
Plaintiffs,

A F F I D A V I T
C i v i l No. 216,731

vs.
JOLENE JAYE SIMONS, a minor,
and DAN C. SIMONS,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
} ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

The undersigned B. Lloyd Poelman, first being duly sworn
on oath deposes and says:
1.

•

I am counsel for defendants in this action and I

am familiar with the proceedings herein.
2.

On September 11, 1975, after two days of evidence

and testimony, the above entitled court submitted the issues
in this action to the panel of eight jurors, namely George
S. Davis, Helen Dille, Robyn Johanson, Wayne Croft, Galen
R. Coles, Faline L. Beal, Gerald J. Facer, and Karen L. Cannon.
3.

The case was submitted upon instructions requiring

the. jury to find of favor of the defendants if they found
that the plaintiff Judith Johnson was contributorily negligent
in causing the accident and the injuries suffered on January
13, 1973.

The jury returned its verdict in favor of the

plaintiff and awarding judgment against the defendants in
the sum of $1,500 for special damages and $35,000 general
damages.
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" 4.

I have spoken with all eight of the jurors.

In

each instance the jurors voluntarily stated to me that they
found that both Judith Johnson and Jolene Jaye Simons were
negligent in causing the accident and injuries.

My first

question to each of the jurors was why they awarded $1,500
in special damages rather than $6,774.83, which was the total
of the invoices submitted.

The jurors uniformly stated that

they did so because they believed that insurance had probably
paid 80% of the medical expenses incurred.

My next question

in each instance was where they believed Judith Johnson was >
standing when she was struck.

All of the jurors reported .

that they concluded she was standing in the road.

All of

the jurors also stated that Judith Johnson was negligent
in standing on the road rather than remaining off the road
until the way was clear for her to proceed.
5.

On September 13, 1975 at 1:30 o1clock p.m. I telephoned

Robyn Johanson (484-9864), who stated "It was my ovm personal
feeling that there was negligence on the part of both girls
but that more fault fell on the driver." He also stated that
the Johnson girl was on the street and that it was negligent
for her to be there at the time of the accident.

He stated

that the jurors speculated on whether there was insurance and
that is why they awarded only a part of the special damages.
6.

On September 13, 1975 at 1:40 o'clock p.m. I telephoned

Faline L. Beal (266-8763), who served as foreman of the jury.
Mrs. Beal stated that she definitely believed that there was
negligence on the part of both parties, that she assumed Niss
Johnson was on the street at the time of the accident, and
that the amount of the award which otherwise would have been
made was lowered because Miss Johnson was also negligent.
7.

On September 13, 1975 at 1:45 o'clock p.m. I telephoned

Gerald J. Facer (299-0736), who stated that it was apparent
from the invoice billings comprising Exhibit P-8 that Mr.
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Johnson had insurance coverage, which the jurors assumed
was with Aetna through his Federal Government employment.
He said, "The reason we cut it (the award) down so far was
that the group felt she was standing in the roadway and there
was negligence on both girls." Mr. Facer also stated that
all seven of the jurors who voted in favor of the verdict
thought there was negligence on both parties. When I asked
Mr. Facer whether he was aware that if the jury found Miss
Johnson was contributorily negligent they should not have
made a money award, he replied that the group felt that the
greater negligence was on Jolene.
8.

On September 14, 1975 at 2:45 o'clock p.m. I telephoned

Karen L. Cannon (966-0346), who stated "I figured the accident
was both of their fault."

She said she concluded that the

Johnson girl was on the road at the time of the accident
and that she should not have been on the street.

She said

in her judgment the girls shared the blame 50-50.

When I

asked whether she was aware that no money award should have
been granted if both parties were negligent, she said that
she and one of the male jurors thought that was the instruction
and asked about it; that the jury foreman looked through
the instructions and couldn't find anything to that effect;
and that consequently the seven jurors voted in favor of
an award even though they believed Judith Johnson was also
negligent.
9.

.

On September 15, 1975 at 8:50 o'clock a.m. 1 telephoned

Helen Dille (364-8264), who stated that the jury assumed
there was insurance coverage and therefore they awarded only
part of the special damages.

She further stated that she

believed both parties were at fault in causing the accident
and that she was not aware that no award should be given
if they believed Judith Johnson was also partly at fault
in causing the accident.
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10. On September 15, 1975 I received a telephone message
asking me to phone Galen R. Coles.

I phoned him at home that

evening and he said that he had come to the conclusion that
the jury had not followed the instructions of the court and
he felt terrible about it. He explained that shortly after
retiring to the jury room and selecting a foreman, a straw
poll was taken and all of the jurors except Mr. Davis stated
their belief that both of the girls were negligent in
causing the accident, but Mr. Davis believed only the pedestrian was negligent. Mr. Coles also stated his personal
belief that Miss Johnson was standing in the roadway at the*
time of the collision and that she was negligent in being
there.
11. On September 17, 1975 at 9:45 o'clock a.m. I telephoned Wayne Croft at his place of employment (486-1304).
Mr. Croft stated that he believed Judith Johnson was standing
in the roadway at the time of the accident and in so doing
she was contributorily negligent.

He further stated that he

understood the instructions of the court to mean that if she
was contributorily negligent no award of damages should be
made to the plaintiffs, but that he disregarded that instruction and made an award of damages anyway because he knew that
Miss Johnson had suffered a great deal.
12. I have read the foregoing and declare the content
thereof to be true of my own knowledge except as to matters
set forth upon information and belief and as to such matters
I believe them to be true.

*

/B. LLOYD

^

.

FGELHM
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